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THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD LIBERTY
OF CONTRACT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A NEW JERSEY insurance agency succeeded in bringing to the
Supreme Court of the United States its complaint that a Now
Jersey statute, prohibiting insurance companies from paying to
any local agent commissions in excess of those paid to any other
local agent, infringed upon its "liberty" to contract about its
affairs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The com-
plaint was appealing. Agency and principals had agreed upon
a 25% commission as "reasonable" within the terms of their
contracts. Both desired that the contracts be performed. The
only obstacle was that another broker had agreed to accept a
20% commission. The latter made no complaint. Nothing
stood in the way of performance of the contract, except the
company's reluctance to disobey the statute. Four Justices of
1 O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup.
Ct. 130 (1931). This was a consolidation of two actions at law against two
separate insurance companies to recover commissions alleged to bo duo




the Court 2 recognized the obvious infringement of the parties'
liberty, recalled the Court's prior insistence that "freedom of
contract is the general rule, restraint the exception," and, hav-
ing been given no grounds to justify the exception in the case
before them, concluded, of necessity, that the statute was un-
constitutional. But five Justices3 took seriously what had
hitherto come to be meaningless bromides, that the judicial an-
nulment of legislative enactments is, at best, a dangerous busi-
ness, that the power to that end is to be exercised only in the
"clearest" cases, that statutes are not to be annulled unless in-
validity is clearly proved by a presentation of the underlying
facts which condition constitutionality. Since no "factual founda-
tion of record for overthrowing the statute" was presented, and
since it did "not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any
facts of which the court must take judicial notice," that evils
"did not exist" for which this statute was "an appropriate rem-
edy" "the presumption of constitutionality" had, of necessity, to
prevail.4 The long list of cases cited by the four dissenters
in which the "general rule" of liberty of contract was used to
overthrow legislation even in the face of a factual foundation in
favor of validity was simply ignored.
Less than one month after these opinions were read from
the Bench, Near v. Min1nesota, ' was argued before the same
court. Near complained that a Minnesota statute which au-
thorized a permanent injunction, issued by a Minnesota court,
restraining him from publishing a newspaper containing "mali-
cious, scandalous and defamatory matter" deprived him of
"liberty" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. His com-
plaint was not at all appealing. The nine issues of the newspaper
which he had published prior to the injunction proceedings
were part of the record in the case.0 They were devoted in large
part to scandalous charges against certain public officers of the
county, private individuals, leading newspapers of the city, and
the Jewish race. The articles were written in the vernacular
2 Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, J. J.
3 Hughes, C. J., Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Roberts, J. J.
4 In several later cases, attacks on legislation failed for similar lack of
"factual foundation." See Notes (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 1136, (1931) 40
YALE L. J. 657; Hamilton, Thc Jurist's Art (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1073.
283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
The suit for injunction was brought by the County Attorney pur-uant
to the authority conferred by the statute for the institution of such suit
by him, or on his failure or refusal, by the Attorney General, or on his
failure or refusal, by any citizen of the county. As interpreted by the State
Court, the statute left all other civil and criminal remedies in force and was
aimed not at the redress of private wrongs but at the suppression, for "the
protection of the public welfare," of newspapers continually publishing
scandalous and defamatory charges, with regard to private persons, or
against public officers, of corruption, malfeasance in office or neglect of duty.
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of the street, with bold-faced, large type generously interspersed
for emphasis. The language was undoubtedly scurrilous. Style
and language were obviously focused on appeals to prejudice
and passion, even if truth were written. Near's associates in
a prior enterprise of the same kind had concededly used that
newspaper for blackmail purposes. Near made no attempt to
prove the truth of any of his charges or that his "motives"
were good.' He relied on his "freedom" to publish even false
charges, conceding possible liability to subsequent punishment.
The Court again divided, exactly as in the O'Gorman case.
Mr. Justice Butler, of Minnesota, wrote an opinion in which
the three Justices who were with him in the O'Gorman case con-
curred. They agreed with the rest of the Court that "freedom
of speech and of the press" was a "liberty" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that it was nevertheless subject
to some control by the State. The Minnesota courts had, "in due
course of judicial procedure" adjudged that Near was engaged
in the "business of publishing" "malicious, scandalous and de-
famatory matter" and abated it as a "public nuisance." The
statute authorizing this measure was passed "in the exertion of
the State's power of police" and the Supreme Court, "by well
established rule," must assume "until the contrary is clearly
made to appear, that there exists in Minnesota a state of affairs
that justifies this measure for the preservation of the peace and
good order of the State." And they pointed, inter alia, to chap-
ter and verse in the O'Gorma case. Not only did Near's
attack lack "factual foundation," but the presumption of validity
was bolstered by the obvious scurrility of the articles, by the
history of Near's previous enterprise, by the shootings which
Near himself attributed to his publications.
The five Justices, whose teaching in the O'Gorman case had
thus been absorbed, were willing to accede to these characteriza-
tions of Near's business and publications. They were willing to
assume the falsity of his charges,-to admit that the persons
involved in them were "impeccable." But they found in the
"general conception" of "liberty of the press, historically con-
sidered and taken up by the Federal Constitution," the "essen-
tial attribute" of freedom from "previous restraint" which they
thought was violated by the statute. While recognizing as
"undoubtedly true" that "the protection even as to previous
restraint is not absolutely unlimited," the limitations were of
such "exceptional nature" as only to clarify the "general con-
ception" and were "not applicable" to the case at bar. Charges
7 The statute made "available the defense that the truth was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends." Whether the same defense
would be available in contempt proceedings for violation of the injunction
was left in doubt both by the statute and by the State Court.
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like those made by Near "unquestionably create a public scandal,
but the theory of the constitutional gharanty is that even a more
serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent pub-
lication." That the liberty of the press may be abused by "mis-
creant purveyors of scandal" does not lessen the necessity of im-
munity of the press from previous restraint "when dealing with
official misconduct," even as the existence of abuses in "the wide
field of activity in the making of contracts," which is otherwise
"subject to legislative supervision," had been held by the Court
to be insufficient to justify interference "with what are deemed
to be certain indispensable requirements" of the "liberty of con-
tract," "notably with respect to the fixing of prices and wages."
The O'Gommn case, and the reliance on it by the minority, was
not mentioned. The statute was declared invalid and the decree
granting the injunction reversed.
Thus was the conflict between the two groups thrown into
sharp relief. Every member of the Court changed his attitude,
shifting from one rule of presumption in the one case to an op-
posite rule of presumption in the other. But the two cases do
more than illustrate the opportunistic use of precedents and
logic. They do more than distinguish the five Justices who con-
stituted the majority in both. They are a hopeful sign pointing
in the direction of the ideal of freedom.
The ideal of freedom, has been termed "the holy grail of
social progress." 8 The way to its acquisition may be blocked by
the tyranny of government. But governmental restraints are
not the sole obstruction. The path may be blocked even more
effectively by physical barriers, or by our whole complex social
and economic organization. Even in the absence of govern-
mental restraint, one is not free to grow plants in rock; nor is
a miner free to join a union when the cost is loss of his job
and inability to secure another. Our state and federal govern-
ments have attempted, therefore, to secure greater freedom to
individuals by compelling the removal of compulsions incident
to our social and economic organization, by limiting the power
of some to dominate the choice of others. Such attempts were
the minimum wage laws, the hours of labor laws, the yellow dog
contract, employment agencies and ticket-scalping legislation.
When the constitutionality of this legislation was challenged,
the Supreme Court postulated the existence and maintenance of
the economic organization in which we happened to find our-
selves. When it invalidated these statutes in the name of "lib-
erty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it frankly
meant the liberty to maintain, promote and exploit advantages
8 Hamilton, "Freedom and Economic Necessity," in ICALTN, FREro u iN
THE MODERN WORMD (1928) 25.
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which some had secured as a result of that organization." The
"liberty" protected was liberty from governmental attempts to
relax human, economic constraints on freedom. Of course, that
protection had not always been accorded. The full potentialities
of the due process clauses in this regard were slow in being
recognized.10 But after recognition, the clauses became a bar to
be hurdled only by legislation supported by a strong showing of
appropriateness under the "police power." The presumption of
constitutional validity always received a verbal bow; the real
embraces were given the presumption of constitutional invalid-
ity.
The change in the Court's affections, displayed by the majority
in the O'Gorman case, can undoubtedly be justified simply by the
ugly appearance of the record. The case was confessedly a test
suit. Yet, no party interested in upholding the statute was joined
or appeared. The respondents, like the petitioner, were willing,
perhaps even anxious, to have the statute invalidated. The issuos
had been joined by motions to dismiss the defendants' answers
based on the statute. Apparently no evidence was offered or in-
troduced at the hearing on the motions. The record before the
Supreme Court comprised but forty-two pages and consisted
wholly of the formal' pleadings in the two cases, captions, formal
notice between counsel and the formal papers on appeal. Not a
line in the record added anything to the words of the statute by
way of light for the determination of the issue of constitution-
ality. While the petitioner in the Supreme Court filed a thirty-
nine page brief in opposition to the act, in addition to the "state-
ment as to jurisdiction on appeal," a single attorney filed but one
four page brief for both insurance companies in its defense. lie
cited four cases and filled two pages of the brief with quotations
of general statements from them.11 Even if the fate of this legis-
9 See Pitney, J. in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 17, 35 Sup. Ct. 240,
244 (1915): "No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists,
there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally hap-
pens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered
by circumstances."
10 See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
(1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 431, 422 et seq.
,After argument, pursuant to the Court's permission, he filed "sup-
plemental memoranda" of three and one-half pages in which he set forth for
the first time somewhat similar legislation of Missisippi and Louisiana re-
lating to commissions of insurance agencies. He had also "gathered from
questions addressed by members of the Court that doubt was entertained
as to the good faith of the defendants... . in defending the statute" and he
attempted to quiet the doubt. While the companies were willing to pay the
petitioners the commissions agreed upon, if the statute did not prohibit,
they were "desirous of final determination as to [its] constitutionality."
The particular "form by which the constitutionality was being tested" was
chosen, in preference to suit for injunction against the state officers, not in
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lation were ordinarily to be settled by a struggle with the pre-
sumption of invalidity, pure sportsmanship could hardly permit
the award of victory to the presumption when the statute's cause
was championed by a straw gladiator.'- But the majority's opin-
ion shows more than sportsmanship. Recent developments have
indicated that our economic organization has not the skill of
conveniently curing its ills. Governmental aid appears inevitable.
Man is not born into our society free of economic constraints.
Legislation relaxing them may more likely be an enhancement of
than a restriction upon the "liberty of contract." The Court is
not to stand in the way of experimentation. ,The addition of two
vigorous thinkers to the Bench has carried the day for pragma-
tism and liberal tolerance of legislative experiment with control
for the purpose of advancing a larger capacity for individual
freedom.
Personal liberties, freedom of speech and of the press, received
constitutional protection earlier than the "liberty of contract,"
but the protecting cloak of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
thrown over them till after that liberty had become firmly estab-
lished.' 3 The Federal Constitution contains in the First Amend-
ment the absolute prohibition that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The state
constitutions generally qualify the similar prohibition on state
legislatures with a clause saving power to impose responsibility
for abuse of the freedom thus guaranteed. But the difference in
phraseology is apparently nothing more than that. Judicial in-
terpretation has engrafted even on the absolute prohibition a
limitation in favor of a power "inherent" in government to pro-
tect itself and to maintain "peace and order." After the abor-
tiveken andl Sedition Laws of 1798, Congress has not directly
restrigned freedom of speech and of the press until the Espio-
nage Acts of the World War period. Long prior to the war, how-
ever, the states had imposed restraints and the patriotic fervor
of the war brought on a further avalanche.1
4
The Espionage Acts survived attack based on the First Amend-
bad faith, but simply to avoid procedural difficulties in the New Jersey
practice which might have hindered "decision on the real question in issue."
The parties' unusual preferment of the state courts over the federal district
court, in which this test suit could have been prosecuted either originally
or by removal, apparently needed no explanation, although federal juris-
diction existed both on federal question and diversity of citizenship
grounds. In conclusion, counsel expressed the belief "that every case that
can throw light on the subject has been presented to this-court."
-o A test case staged like the O'Gorman case involves even greater evils
than those feared from advisory opinions and declaratory judgments. See
Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions (1924) 3T Ht,%Rv. L. R V. 970.
13 See Warren, op. cit. supra note 10.
'U See CHAFEE, Fn0ao i OF SPEECH (1920) c. 1 and 4.
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ment, but with the important qualification, laid down for a
unanimous court by Mr. Justice Holmes, that "the question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent." The Court assumed that the pro-
hibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech was "not con-
fined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have
been the main purpose." 15 With one possible exception,1" stato
restraints, until the last term, met with similar success. The
battle was waged on the front of the "privileges and immunities"
and "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
statutes imposed punishment for talk not censorship. The Court
"assumed" for the purposes of the cases before them that free-
dom of speech was a "liberty" and that the due process clause
limited the power to punish as well as the power to impose pre-
vious restraint.17 It found that the restraints imposed were with-
in "implied exceptions" to the prohibition.18
In Stromberg v. California 19 and Near v. Minnesota, the Court
15 Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).
See Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1148 and CHArFE, op. cit. supra. note 14,
for sources as to freedom of speech and previous restraint.
16 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 655 (1927).
17 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 630 (1925).
As late as 1922, in answering a contention that freedom of speech included
a "freedom of silence," which was infringed by a state statute requiring
employers to give "service letters" to discharged employees, the Court said
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restriction
about 'freedom of speech'." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 543,
42 Sup. Ct. 516, 522 (1922).
18 But in reviewing cases under state acts, the Court was not to be gov-
erned by the considerations announced in the Espionage cases. Those wore
deemed to refer only to the interpretation of the Espionage Acts--nof to
the issue of constitutionality. In reviewing cases from state courts, the
Court was not to consider whether "in each case" the words were spoken
under "such circumstances" and were "of such a nature" as to create "a
clear and present danger" that they would bring about the "substantive
evils" that the states have "a right to prevent." It was to consider only
whether the legislature could have determined reasonably that the "class"
of language prohibited by the statute, as verbally interpreted, rather thati
as effectively administered, created a reasonable danger of such substan-
tive evils. And of this, the mere enactment of the statute would be weighty
proof. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 670, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 63f1 (1925).
But compare Brandeis' dissent ii Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372,
374, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 647 (1927), and the last paragraph of the Court's
opinion in the Stromberg case, infra note 19.
29 283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931). The Court declared invalid the
provision in the California Penal Code making it a felony to display a red
flag "as a sign . . . of opposition to organized government." Since Miss
Stromberg's conviction might have been based on that provision alone, the
Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the provisions making felonious the
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held affirmatively, rather than assumed ad hoc, that freedom of
speech was a "liberty" within the due process clause. In both
cases, the plaintiff's interests could well have been regarded as
interests of substance, of "property", just as in Meyer v. Ne-
braska 20 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 21 freedom to teach was
referred to the teacher's calling and to the school's business-
"property-liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Instead, the legislation was invalidated on the ground that
"liberty" was taken without due process. Personal liberty.
Liberty without material value. In authorizing an injunction
with the power to punish for contempt, the statute in the Near
case was deemed to impose a censorship by the equity court-a
previous restraint on speech. The statute was therefore declared
invalid, not because restraint was unjustified but because the
form in which it was to be exerted was not permissible.
The difference between previous restraint and subsequent
punishment does not, of course, determine the effectiveness of the
restraint. As has been suggested, a death penalty for publication
would be a more effective preventive than censorship. The in-
junction issued in the Near case was phrased in the exact words
of the statute. It was no more definite or vague in its prohibi-
tions than was the statute. If the statute had provided only for
criminal punishment for the proscribed publications, Near would
have been under exactly the same restraint arising from the
statute itself as he was under the injunction. With one difference.
A violation of the supposed statute would have resulted in a
criminal prosecution before a judge and probably also a jury.
A violation of the injunction would have resulted in summary
contempt proceedings before the equity judge. The difference
is striking in view of the historic struggle for greater jury
powers in criminal libel cases. -2 But it wanes considerably in
view of the Supreme Court's holding that the Federal Constitu-
tion contains no guaranty of jury trial in state courts.23 It would
display of a flag as "an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an
aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character." It did not have "to
review the historic controversy with respect to 'sedition laws' or to con-
sider the question as to the validity of a statute dealing broadly and vaguely
with what is termed seditious conduct, without any limiting interpretation
either by the statute itself or by judicial construction." Cf. the opinion of
Brandeis, J. in the Whitney ease, supra note 18. The death gasp of the
doubt as to whether "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
freedom of speed and of the press is uttered in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Butler in the Stromberg case.
20 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923).
21268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925).
22 See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 14, c. 1; Pound, Eq2itable Relief Againt
Defamation (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 655.
23 See Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 468. The doubt as to whether truth
1931]
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have been more gratifying if the inarticulate dislike of legisla-
tion which imposes so vague and so dangerous a restraint upon
freedom of speech had been made articulate.
But, by whatever means, the Court has removed an obstruc-
tion to freedom of speech and of the press. Only commendation
can be given to the majority's refusal to yield to the importunities
of the minority in the Stromberg and Near cases, that procedural
difficulties and technical faults in the conduct of the litigation
below prevented consideration of the larger issues on which the
decisions were based. Review by the Supreme Court, even if its
members were of one mind, is a weak safeguard of personal lib-
erty. It can review only a very small fraction of the cases liti-
gated. For the most part, this liberty is at the mercy of execu-
tive and administrative officers and trial courts. But while per-
sonal liberty must thus look for protection to our generally be-
coming "more civilized," the Supreme Court can set a brilliant
example.24
The existing capacities for freedom of speech and of the press,
its impingement on the liberty of others and the incidence
of the legislation thereon differ widely from that of the freedom
of contract sought to be protected against hours of labor, mini-
mum wage, "yellow dog contract", and similar laws. "Freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think" is the vehicle to
more general liberty; its complete exercise by some does not in-
fringe upon the like liberty of others, whatever other evils it may
would be a defense in contempt proceedings should be mentioned as a fur-
ther possible difference.
24 Innumerable restraints on freedom of thought and speech exist with
only the remotest, if any, possibility of Supreme Court review: in the en-
forcement of laws relating to immigration, naturalization, deportation, the
mails (of. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352
(1921)) the tariff, radio broadcasting, the theatre, public assembly, street
speaking and all manler of local police ordinances with avowed objects such
as facilitation of traffic, etc. See Comment (1931) 40 YALe, L. J. 967; Note
(1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1148; Grant and Angoff, Massachusetts and Cen-
sorship (1930) 10 BOSTON U. L. Rsv. 36, 147. Mr. Justice Butler's attempt
in the Near case to assimilate scandalous charges against public officers
with "obscene" publications overlooks obvious differences, as would
also an assimilation of such charges, and of discussions of political, social
or economic problems, with invasions of privacy by the publication of mat-
ters concerning only an individual's private affairs and having no public
interest other than the satisfaction of curiosity. Compare the English
equity jurisdiction to restrain publication of certain libels on candidates
for public office on the eve of an election, DAwSON, LAw OF TI1E P1aESS
(1927) 197.
The serious abridgments of freedom of speech and other personal liber-
ties by labor injunctions issdied for the avowed purpose of protecting pri-
vate property, without regard to the public interest involved, cries for
courageous action. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Maxey in Iraomer
Hosiery Co. v. Schmidt, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Oct. 9, 1931.
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cause. But freedom to contract as you will and impose whatever
conditions you can may be a sure means of oppression; its com-
plete exercise by some often results in the curtailment of the
like freedom of others. A larger capacity for liberty to contract
in our economic organization may well need governmental con-
trol of the power to exert economic compulsion. -  But a larger
capacity for the liberty of speech needs primarily absence of
governmental restraint on speech. Legislation designed to pro-
mote a larger capacity for freedom by the relaxation of economic
compulsion may, indeed, be presumed valid. But a contrary pre-
sumption seems eminently proper when legislation constricts the
existing larger capacity by imposing new governmental re-
straints.
H. S.
SIXTH TENTATIVE DRAFT OF A U1NIFORM MECANICS'
LIEN STATUTE
MECHANICS' lien acts, designed primarily to protect one who con-
tributes his services to the improvement of real property by con-
stituting it a security for his remuneration, require delicate
draftsmanship in order to accomplish this purpose without in-
fringing upon rights of the owner of the property and third par-
ties whose interest in it may be affected by such liens. The effec-
tiveness of the tentative draft of a Uniform Mechanics' Lien
Act,' recently approved by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, in achieving a fair balance be-
tween these conflicting interests can best be estimated by com-
parison with present statutes.
State statutes very generally stipulate that the right given the
lienor is one in rem,2 and that the liability of the owner's prop-
erty is measured by the price stated in his original contract with
the general contractor3 Both of these provisions are adopted by
the Uniform Act in section 2. Further, it is customarily provided
25 The very rapid growth of the use of standardized contracts (zee Com-
ment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 640, 644) is only one of the striking indications
that in reality the issue, in the economic world, is not as to a choice betwcen
complete individual freedom and governmental control, but rather as to a
choice between governmental control and existing control by other institu-
tions.
IReport of Committee on Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act, including Sixth
Tentative Draft of a Proposed Act, National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Sept. 8-14, 1931.
2See for example COLO. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 45S0;
R. L GEN. LAWs (1923) c. 301-1. But cf. VA. CODE Ax=¢. (1930) § 6420a
(owner made personally liable to the extent of his indebtedness to the
contractor at the time notice is given).
3 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2463; MICH. Co11P. LAWs (1929) § 13101.
19311
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that when one entitled to a lien notifies the owner of the existence
of an unpaid debt for services owed him by the contractor, the
owner shall withhold such sum from his payments during the
progress of the work, for the benefit of the lien claimant.4 But
they fail to specify to any sufficient degree what payments by
the owner to the contractor or lienors, actually operate to reduce
his statutory liability to other lienors. Where the amount re-
covered by lienors against the owner's property is greater than
the contract price less installments already paid to the general
contractor, several states allow the owner to recover the excess; 
but a right of action against a probably insolvent contractor is
only a doubtful protection. A few states provide that while the
property shall not become liable for more than the original con-
tract price, the owner must assume the risk of all payments made
within the time allowed a lienor fort filing his claim of lien, usu-
ally a specified number of days after the lienor performs the last
labor or last furnishes materials. So general a provision is also
unsatisfactory, not only to the owner, who will hesitate before
making any payment, but also to the contractor who depends on
the regular installments of the agreed price. A third, rare type
of provision fixes the terms of the original contract without re-
gard to the desires of the parties by requiring the postponement
of certain payments for a specified period.7 Such a provision,
A few statutes increase the owner's liability. ALA. CODE ANN. (1928)
§ 8832 (materialmen become entitled to full value of claim by giving early
notice to owner who does not repudiate such liability); Aniz. Rsv, CODE,
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 2020 (owner liable for reasonable value of labor or
materials furnished his agent); CAL. CODE OF CIV. PsO0. (Deering, 1923) §
1183 (liens limited to contract price only if bond filed); ILL. RIEV. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 82, § 22-25 (property may become liable for full
debt on notice to owner); IOWA CODE (1931) § 10280 (only one class of
liens limited to amount due contractor from owner); Miss. ANN. CODE
(1930) § 2274 (owner loses limited liability by denying any indebtedness
due contractor, in foreclosure suit by lienor).
4 See N. Y. 'CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 34, § 14; N. C. CODE ANN.
(1927) § 2439.
5 See IDAHO Comp. STAT. (1919) § 7350. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, New Mexico, Nevada and Oregon have similar statutes. 0f. TiEC.
COmPL. STAT. (1928) § 5463.
6 KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 60 § 1403. Cf. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 8312 (risk on owner for stated period if he pays without requiring
a statement as to sums due lienors from contractor). These statutes leave
it uncertain whether at any given time the risk is upon the owner in favor
of all lienors until the expiration of the period within which the last lien
claimant could file his statement, or whether the risk exists only as to those
whose periods have run.
7 COLO. STAT. ANN. (CourtrighVs Mills, 1930) § 4581 (no advance pay-
ments on contract to be made; at least 15% of contract price to be payable
no sooner than thirty-five days after complete performance of contract; no
payments prior to that time will defeat or diminish the lienor's claim);
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while not objectionable to the owner, may be decidedly disadvan-
tageous for the contractor. By far the most prevalent type of
provision declares that the liability of the owner to any lienor,
in respect to his property, is limited to the contract price less pay-
ments in good faith to the contractor."
In adopting the underlying theory of this last provision, the
Uniform Act has attempted to remedy its failure to define "pay-
ments in good faith" by a well organized, novel summary on the
subject of "money properly paid." The owner may at any time
pay a laborer the amount due him for his services to the prop-
erty.P All liens, except those of laborers or persons contracting
directly with the owner must be perfected by notice, and lienors
who give such notice within a limited time are preferred to those
who are not so diligent. 0 The owner may pay a preferred lienor
any amount owed him, provided that the balance of the contract
price, after all other proper payments are deducted, is sufficient
to pay all other preferred lienors and laborers the amounts due or
to become due them.", But payments to other lienors are not
"properly" made unless a sufficient amount remains, after all
proper deductions, to pay all debts due or to become due to la-
borers, including those subsequently employed, and to all lienors
who have previously given or thereafter give notice.1- When the
contract price is insufficient for payments in full the owner may
pay any lien claimant the pro-rata amount for which his claim
would ultimately be allowed. 3 Payments to the general contrac-
tor (which are prma facie made in good faith) are properly
made when due and payable according to the original contract,
providing that after all proper deductions a sum remains, out
of the contract price, sufficient to pay all laborers and all other
lienors who have previously given, or thereafter give, notice.4
However, the added clarification of the owner's position with
regard to payments made during the progress of the work is ac-
companied by an unprecedented increase in his risk. Since la-
borers are not required to give any notice, he must discover at
his peril all sums due or to become due them, with the further
ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) c. 51-110; cf. W. Va. OFFICIAL CODE (1931) c. 38-
23 (owner must require bond from contractor under penalty of subjecting
his property to a liability to the full extent of all claims).
8 See CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5108; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930)
c. 34, § 4.9 UNIFORM AM[ECHANIC'S LimN ACT, § 5-2.
10 Ibid § 4.
"Ibid. § 5-3.
- Ibid. § 5-4.
13 Ibid. § 5-5.
'14 Ib&i § 5-8. For statutes maling special concessions to laborers concern-
ing notice, see IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 9831; MICH. Con. LAWS
<1929) § 13101; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 289.02(2).
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disadvantage that progress payments or payments direct to lien-
ors do not lessen the liability of his property to laborers subse-
quently employed. Yet an owner of real property would probably
be better able to bear a financial loss than a laborer,15 though the
same cannot be said with any degree of certainty of materialmen,
subcontractors or skilled specialists. The owner can always, how-
ever, distribute the risk by requiring a bond from the contrac-
tor conditioned on full and faithful performance including pay-
ment of all lien claims.10 Nor does the Uniform Act leave him
without safeguards in the matter of payment, since it gives him
the right to demand from the lienor, whenever any payment is
due the contractor, a written statement under oath concerning
his account with the contractor,17 and the further right to re-
quire the contractor before the final payment to furnish a similar
itemized statement as to his accounts with all lienors,19 upon
which the owner may in good faith rely, except as regards the
liens of laborers. The furnishing of a false statement to the
owner with intent to defraud is made a crime.19
The Uniform Act does not expressly state whether the owner
in a suit by employees of the contractor to foreclose a lien, may
set-off or counterclaim for damages based upon the contractor's
failure to perform.20 Some state statutes have given," and a few
have denied 22 the right, and consequently judicial holdings under
15 Laborer is defined by the Uniform Act, Section 1, as "any person other
than an architect, landscape architect, engineer and the like, who, under
properly authorized contract, personally performs on the site of the im-
provement labor or services for improving real property."
Is Ibid. § 7.
27 Ibid. § 26-2.
18 Ibid. § 4-3, and 5-12. The present Ohio statute provides that the risk
of payment within a specified period is on the owner unless before each pay-
ment an itemized statement of the contractor's accounts with all his em-
ployees is required, accompanied by a similar itemized statement of all sub-
contractors, and certificates of all materialmen. In making payments the
owner may rely upon these to reduce the liability of his property. Oio
GEN: CODE (Page, 1926) § 8312. Under such a statute the risk as to
amounts to become due in the future rests upon the lienors. The Uniform
Act seems preferable in that, as has been pointed out, the owner can better
bear such risk. And his right to demand a statement from any lienor at
the time of payment seems to protect him as to the claims presently existing
as fully as the more cumbersome Ohio procedure.
19 UNIFORM MECHANICS' LIEN ACT, § 9.
20 § 2 gives a lien for services furnished in accordance with the claim-
ant's contract and the direct contract. Therefore the right of set-off or coun-
terclaim may possibly be implied against such lienors.
21D. C. CODE (1929) § 354; MICH. COMP. LAWS (1929) § 13101; N. C.
CODE ANN. (1927) § 2476; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8313; of. VA.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 6483.
22 CoLD. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 4581; CAL. CODU OF




a statute without express provision in the matter will probably
vary, thus defeating the purpose of a uniform act. A definite
provision might well have been inserted. Likewise there has been
division among the states as'to whether an owner may stipulate
in a building contract that his property shall not be subject to
the liens of an employee of the contractor. 3 Since such a stipula-
tion nullifies the effect of a mechanics' lien act, it should be ex-
pressly forbidden by the Uniform Act to prevent a judicial deci-
sion upholding the contract.
The provisions of the Uniform Act with regard to the rights
of lienors are significant in two particulars, namely the priorities
among lienholders, and the protection given the individual against
encroachments on his rights by fellow lienors. With respect to
the latter, the provisions in Section 5 of the Uniform Act are
unique in the protection afforded lienors against loss thruough
payments to fellow lienors, as discussed above. As to priority,
however, practically all the states have legislated. Many provide
that, except for the general contractor's lien, there shall be an
equal right in the property to the extent of its liability.2 Others
divide lienors into classes, each of which is to be paid in full, or,
if the amount available is not sufficient, pro-rata, before any
other class shall be entitled to payment. Of these latter, some
base priority on the time of giving or filing notice.-23 A rare basis
of classification has been the order in which the work was done
or the materials furnished.2 0 The more approved practice, how-
ever, has been to give priority to the liens of laborers as a class,
thus giving the greatest protection where it is most needed. 7
The Uniform Act creates classes having priority in the follow-
ing order (a) liens of laborers; (b) liens of all other lienors who
have given notice of an intention to claim a lien within a limited
period after their services were first rendered; (c) all other liens
except that of the contractor; (d) the contractor's lien.2 3
This differentiation between lienors on the basis of whether or
not notice was given within a stated period after the lienor be-
23For states allowing such stipulations upon the filing of the contract
among public records, see ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 82, § 21;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 9831; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
Title 49, § 72; cf. MAiNE REv. STAT. (1930) c. 165 § 30. For statutes
nullifying such stipulations see CAL. CODE OF CIV. P oc. (Deering, 1923)
§ 1201; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 289.03; Coro. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's
Iills, 1930) § 4600; cf. N. Y. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 34 § 34. Cf.
UNIFORM M.ECHANIcS' Lmx AcT, § 27.
24 See ARiz. REV. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 2036;- MICH. Co,1P. Lws
(1929) § 13109; cf. D. C: CoDE (1929) § 362.
2 FLA. GMN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 5379; IOWA CODE (1931) § 1028G.
2r DEL. REV. CODE (1915) § 2850.
-ILL. REV. CODE (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 82, § 27; N. Y. CoNS. Iiws
<Cahill, 1930) c. 34, § 25.
28 UNrFOR I MECHANics LiEN, ACT § 6.
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gan to render services, seems desirable. It is not open to the
objection which obtains when priority because of notice follows
strictly on the order of giving notice, namely, that it is unfair to
lienors who begin work at a late dafe. 21 Nor does it create an in-
centive to hasty filing of lien claims, inevitably prejudicial to the
credit of owner and contractor,0 since the priority is based on a
written notice to the owner within the given period, and not on
the time of filing. On the contrary the provision works a definite
benefit to the owner, whose risk as to pAyments is so great under
the Uniform Act, since it will lead to immediate disclosure to him
of any unpaid accounts. Since the differentiation will probably
cause immediate disclosure in almost all cases, the practical effect
of this provision would seem to confer the same status upon all
lienors other than the laborer and contractor.
The contractor, unlike other lienors, receives less protection in
the Uniform Act than is now afforded him by many state stat-
utes. The provision allowing early filing of liens ,1 may seriously
injure his credit,32 while serving no useful purpose to lienors
since it is also provided that liens relate back to the time of the
visible commencement of operations, 33 and are prior to all other
encumbrances on the real estate subsequently recorded34 Certain
state statutes now provide that claims of liens may not be filed
until the lienor has fully performed his services,35 or even for a
given period after that time.3 It is to be regretted that the Uni-
form Act does not contain a similar provision for the contrac-
tor's protection. It does, however, protect him against vexatious
claims of lien by penalizing the claimant,:7 although the penalty
is less severe than that provided for by most state statutes.01
29 Current Legislation (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 997, 1003.
30 Current Legislation (1930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 152, 155.
31 By section 17 of the Uniform Act claims of liens may be filed at any
time during the progress of the work, but not later than three months after
the completion of the lienor's services.
32 Current Legislation (1930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 152, 155.
33 UNIFORM MECHANICS' LIEN ACT § 3-1.
34 Ibid. § 21.
35 See FLA. GEN. LAiWS (Skillman, 1927) § 5380 (2).
36 See DEL. REV. CODE (1915) § 2850. (twenty days after completion of
services) ; cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3175 (lien cannot be filed until ton
days after notice to owner); CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1923)
§ 1184a (suits may not be brought until expiration of filing period).
37 UNIFORi MECHANICS' LIEN ACT § 26-2 (lienor furnishing false state-
ment deprived of lien to extent he has prejudiced an interested party's
right).
38Cf. Ai . DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6921 (failure or re-
fusal to furnish correct list constitutes misdemeanor); CAL. CODE OF Civ.
PROC. (Deering, 1923) § 1202 (forfeiture made penalty for wilfully giving
false notice of lien); N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 34, § 39a (damages
to owner where lien wilfully exaggerated).
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A substantial part of the difficulties in mechanics' lien law has
risen from the issue of priority as between lienors and other
encumbrancers. Present statutes generally provide that mort-
gages or other encumbrances on land recorded prior to the cre-
ation of a particular mechanic's lien, whether its existence date
from the time of filing the lien, O the time when the lienor's serv-
ices were performed,411 the time of serving notice on the owner,4'
or from the visible commencement of building operations,' shall
be superior to that lien as to the land. Under the first three con-
ditions a mortgage recorded during the process of improving the
land may at once have priority over some liens, and be subordi-
nate as to others, thus creating priority classes among lienors
never contemplated by the statute.43 The Uniform Act success-
fully avoids this difficulty, by providing that liens shall relate
back to the visible commencement of building operations. 4 But
the Act fails to remedy in express terms a further defect of many
state acts, namely, their failure to allocate the risk of loss be-
tween a mortgagee of land upon which there is a building at the
time of the mortgage, and lienors who have merely altered or re-
paired such building. Existing statutes generally declare a lien
on buildings to be prior to a previously recorded mortgage on
lind without specific provision for the repair situation.4 5 The
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5105; KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2463;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 254, § 7; N. J. COTP. STAT. (Cune. Supp., 1925)
c. 126-15; S. C. CODE or LAws (1922) § 5669; Cf. MISS. CODE ANN. (1930)
§ 2258; of. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 34, § 13(1).
40 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6922; CAL. CODE OF CrV.
PRoc. (Deering, 1923) § 1186; N. AT. STAT. ANN. (1929) c. 82-205; OiaA.
SESS. LAWS (1923) c. 54 amending OKILA. CoAxP. STALT. ANN. (1921) § 7461;
WASH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1132; W. VA. OFFICLL CODE
(1931) c. 38, § 17.
41 FLA. GEN. LAws (Skillman, 1927) § 5381 (1).
2 MICH. COmp. LAWS (1929) § 13109; MO. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3163;
NEV. Co sp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 3738; cf. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 8494.
-13Comment (1926) 36 YAL L. J. 129, 132.
44 UNIFORM IECHANICS' LIE- ACT § 3-1. § 21 avoids any question which
might have arisen as to the priority of a previous unrecorded mortgage by
providing that mechanics' liens shall be prior to "a conveyance, mortgage,
building loan contract, attachment, judgment or other incumbrance against
such real property which was not recorded, docketed, or filed at the time of
the visible commencement of operations."
45ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6922; Ts-X. COzaPL. STAT.
(1928) § 5459; cf. PA. STAT. AN N. (Purdon, 1930) title 49, § 2G (material
change constitutes "new" structure); but cf. statutes expressly providing
for the repair question: VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 6436 (encumbrance on
both land and buildings previous to lien has priority over lien); ILL. REV.
STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 82, § 2 lienor has priority as to cnhanced
value of property); TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917) § 3536 (mort-
gagee's prior lien subordinate if, after learning of the improvement, he
fails to give the lienor notice to the contrary); LA. REV. STAT. AMN.
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Uniform Act declares that liens provided by the act shall have
priority over encumbrances against such "real property" not
filed at the time of the visible commencement of operations."
Section 1 defines "real property" as "the land that is improved
and the improvements thereon, including fixtures . . ." Conse-
quently, although the result is not a necessary one, it may be im-
plied that incumbrances on both land and buildings actually re-
corded before the work begins will be prior to liens for repairs.4
Further problems are presented by mortgages given under
building loan contracts by which the mortgagor-owner receives
his loans in installments. Since the building is not yet in exist-
ence, the lender who contracts with an unscrupulous or negligent
owner may find his security subject to the liens of laborers. 4
Statutory attempts have been made to meet the problem by giv-
ing complete priority to the building-loan mortgage, 4 or by pre-
ferring it only to the extent of advances made before the filing
of the lien.- Under the latter provision, however, the number of
priority classes created among lienors would be limited in num-
ber only by the number of installments provided for in the build-
ing loan contract. A more desirable type of provision now in-
corporated in the New Jersey 5" New York 12 and Ohio 11 statutes
gives priority to the building loan mortgage, but insures that in-
stallments under it shall be first applied to the claims of lienors.
The Uniform Act by section 8-2 makes it a crime for an owner,
with intent to defraud, to apply the net proceeds of such a loan
to any other purpose than to pay for labor or materials furnished
on such improvement. Although the result is to minimize any
conflict between the lender and the lienor, it might have been
better achieved by incorporating in addition the New York, New
Jersey and Ohio provisions, making the mortgagee's priority de-
(Marr, 1926) Act. 139 of 1922, § 8 (those having mechanics' liens have
priority over such encumbrances, except that of vendor previously recorded,
whenever made). It has been held that in the absence of a statute 6&pressly
giving mechanics' liens priority as to buildings erected subsequent to the
recordation of a mortgage on land, the vested right of the mortgagee at-
taches to the land and whatever may become an integral part thereof. Leach
v. Minick, 106 Iowa 437, 76 N. W. 751 (1898); see Note (1927) 15 Gt..o. L.
J. 477.
46 UNIFORM MECHANICS' LIEN AcT, § 21.
47For a general discussion of the problem, and the conflicting case law
which has developed on the subject in the absence of an express statute on
the subject, see Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 129; Note (1927) 15 GFo.
L. J. 477.
4 Current Legislation (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 996.,
49 See ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6909.
50 D. C. CoDE, ANN. (1929) § 359.
- N. J. Comp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) c. 126-15.
N. Y. CONS. LAWs (Cahill, 1930) § 13 (3).
53 OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8321-1.
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pend on the rightful application of the building loan installments.
In that case both the owner and the lender would have a powerful
motive to see that the money is used first for the lienor's benefit.
A large number of states have no legislation on the extent to
which the rights of the legal title holder are affected by mechan-
ics' liens arising from contracts made by lessees or vendees under
executory contracts of sale. The few that do touch on the point
vary greatly, and do not, in general, deal adequately with the
question. But it seems clear that lienors may foreclose on the
interests of such a vendee or lessee, and that the purchaser at the
fdreclosure sale gets all their rights on performing their cove-
nants. 4 Several states provide that where the vendor or lessor
has consented to the improvements, his interest is subject to the
lien.5 Where, however, there is no consent, and the lessee or
vendee has forfeited his rights to the property the difficulty be-
comes apparent. Many statutes declare that the building may be
sold to satisfy liens arising from building contracts made by the
vendee or lessee,", but these statutes make no specific provision
for the repair situation, with the exception of one which gives
the claimant a lien on the building to the extent to which its
value has been enhanced by his work.-
Section 3 (2) of the Uniform Act provides that liens shall ex-
tend "to and only to the owner's - right, title or interest existing
at the time of the visible commencement of operations, or there-
after acquired, in the real property." The effect of this provision
is, by implication, to cut off liens for repairs on leased property.
Such a result would be unhappy, in view of the purpose of a
mechanics' lien act. It would seem preferable to give the claim-
ant an express lien on the enhanced value of the property. Al-
though such a provision would possibly work hardship on the
owner, since he may find his property subjected to a foreclosure
sale, yet he has probably benefited by the improvement, and in
any event is in a superior position to the lienor in that he can
usually prevent an alteration to his property unless the lease or
contract of sale calls for it. In the latter situation, the Uniform
Act, following a substantial authority among the state statutes
54 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2463 is an example of this very general
provision.
7* See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) § 1192; as to what is con-
sent, see Note (1980) 28 iCH. L. REV. 321, 326.
56 Iowa Code (1931) § 10275; M IONT. REV. CODES (1921) § 8343; ef. WYO.
ComP. STAT. (1920) § 4865 (lienor may, in addition, by performing broken
covenants, be subrogated to rights of lessee and enforce lien). For a Sim-
ilar provision where rights were those of vendee, see Micii. COMP. L,'Lws
(1929) § 13103.
5 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2464.
5 By § 1 of the Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act the term "owner" includes




that such a contract shall be deemed a consent to be liable,"
makes the owner's interest subject to the lien.
The Uniform Act makes no provisions as to foreclosure pro-
ceedings in liens. Since Sec. 37 repeals only acts or parts of acts
"inconsistent" with the Uniform Act, the enforcement of liens is
apparently to continue to follow the customary procedure of the
several states.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF BOND PREMIUMS FOR INCOME1
TAX PURPOSES
THE controversy with regard to the legal status of bond premi-
ums for income tax purposes was initiated in 1920 by the litiga-
tion involving the bonds of the Old Colony Railway Company.
The bonds had been issued between the years 1895 and 19041
and sold at premiums aggregating $199,528.08 which were en-
tered by the company in a special account entitled "Premium on
Bonds." Subsequently, by order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the premiums were amortized over the periods of the
respective lives of bonds, and on the books of the company an
aliquot part was then transferred each year to the profit and
loss account. In 1920 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
sought to include in the taxable income of the company the
amount of premiums apportioned for that year. The Board of
Tax Appeals, however, concluded that the amortization of the
bond premiums "cannot give rise to income where no transaction
has occurred during the taxable year with reference to the sale,
purchase, or payment of the bonds." 2 The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, for the First Circuit, though affirming the decision, based
its affirmance on the constitutional ground that the premiums
were received by the Old Colony prior to the effective date of
the Income Tax Amendment. 3
In order to reflect an aliquot part of the premiums in the Old
Colony's net income for 1921, the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue predicated his claim upon a new theory. Abandoning his
former contention that the bond premiums constituted taxable
1 In 1893 the Old Colony had leased its railroad lines to the New Yozk,
New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Company, under an arrangement
whereby the New Haven was to operate the railroad and pay a certain
rental, including all taxes. For an argument that the lease was a material
factor in the subsequent decisions and that the case is, therefore, un-
satisfactory for test purposes, see Brady, Old Colony Railroad Casc-Aro
Bond Premiums Income, TAX MAGAZINE, September, 1931, at 317, 344.
2 Old Colony Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1025, 1027 (1927).
3Old Colony Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A, 1st,




income, he argued that such premiums in reality represented
the amount by which the nominal rate of interest on the bonds
exceeded the effective rate, or the rate which the company would
have paid had the bonds been sold on the market at par. Under
this theory the interest actually paid each year on the bonds
included an excess which was really not interest at all but
merely the repayment of so much of the investment of the bond
purchaser as was represented by the premium he had paid. Con-
sequently, in computing income the Old Colony would not be en-
titled to deduct as a capital charge that part of the interest which
represented an aliquot part of the premiums received.
Whether the bond premiums are regarded as income or as
"excess interest," the taxable net income of the company of
course remains the same. The distinction, however, becomes of
more than academic importance, where, as in the Old Colony case,
the premiums have been received prior to the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment giving Congress the power to levy or col-
lect taxes on incomes without apportionment. Constitutional ob-
jections are not available if the premiums are to be regarded
as "excess interest," since "what is income is controlled by the
Constitution, while deductions are a statutory concept." 3 The
Board of Tax Appeals, however, on the authority of the 1928 de-
cision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, refused to accept the
Commissioner's theory. But the Circuit Court of Appeals, al-
though speaking of the boid premiums as profit or income,- re-
versed the decision of the Board and allowed the Commissioner's
claim, relying largely on the converse case of WesterL Marylazd
Ry. v. Commnissioner9 where bond discounts wire held to be
equivalent to additional interest payable upon maturity and
-1 The Commissioner's theory is outlined in the case of Fall River Electric
Light Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 163, 170 (1931).
5 Chicago, R. I. & Pacific Ry. v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 938, 1029
(1928).
Old Colony Ry. v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 267 (1929).
7 Bond premiums of course cannot constitute both income and "excess
interest."
8 Old Colony Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
It seems apparent that the court was overruling its former decision in the
1920 case. Money which had previously been held non-taxable was held
taxable, merely because the Commissioner's claim was predicated on a
different theory. But the court endeavored to distinguish the 1920 cae
by saying, "The decision was that a profit made in 1904, before the paage
of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, could
not be taxed. The court's attention was not called to the fact that he
profit made in the early years was not being taxed, but that it was being
used only to determine the expense for the year 1921 of the payment oi
interest on the bonds. This is not a tax, but an allocation under proper
accounting methods for books kept on the accrual basis, of the expense
chargeable to the year 1921."
9 33 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
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therefore deddctible proportionately each year of the life of the
bond as interest accruing for that year.10
In the meanwhile, however, the Board of Tax Appeals, ap-
parently without the knowledge of the court, overruled its former
decision in the 1920 case and held in Fall River Electric Light
Co. v. Commissioner "I that bond premiums represent taxable in-
come to be amortized over the life of the bonds. This most re-
cent decision of the Board was largely based upon rules of statu-
tory construction. Article 544 of Treasury Regulation 45, adopted
under the Revenue Act of 1918, provides that ". . . if bonds are
issued by a corporation at a premium, the net amount of such
premium is gain or income which should be prorated or amor-
tized over the life of the bonds." 12 The provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1918 designed to regulate the determination of the tax-
payer's net income have been reenacted without change in sub-
sequent Acts.13 Accordingly in the Fall River case the Board of
Tax Appeals suggested that regulations which had so long been
in force "should not be upset in the absence of a clear showing
that they are contrary to the statute." 14 But regardless of the
10 The similar decision of the Board in Chicago, R. I. & Pacific Ry. V.
Commissioner, supra note 5, was also cited, apparently without the knowl-
edge that it had been reversed in the interim by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 47 F. (2d) 990 (1931), in reliance on
the court's own opinion in the 1920 Old Colony case.
"I-Supra note 4.
12 21 Treas. Dec. 289 (1919). Article 545 of Treasury Regulations 62,
65, and 69, and Article 68 of Treasury Regulation 74, enacted under the
Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926, and 1928, respectively, contain the same
provision. 24 Treas. Dec. 366 (1922) ; 26 Treas. Dec. 901 (1924); 28 Treas.
Dec. 721 (1926).
13 § 213 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provides "that . . . the term 'gross
income' (a) includes gains, profit and income derived from ...dealings
in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use
of or interest in such property; also from . . . the transaction of any busi-
ness carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever." 40 STAT. 1065 (1918). § 234 (a) of the
same Act provides "that in computing the net income of a corporation ...
there shall be allowed as deductions . . . (2) all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on its indebtedness." 40 STAT. 1077 (1918). § 212
(b) provides that the "net income shall be computed upon the basis of the
taxpayer's annual accounting period in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer;
but if no such method has been employed, or if the method employed does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made upon such
basis and in such manner as in the opinion of the Commissioner does
clearly reflect the income." 40 STAT. 1064 (1918). These provisions wore
all reenacted in the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926, and 1928, and the
cited Regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue merely repre-
sent their "executive construction."
14 Fall River Electric Light Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 4, at 174.
See Brady, op. cit. supra note 1, at 320. It is apparent, however, that the
Board was placing unprecedented emphasis upon the doctrine of "implied
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importance of any rule of statutory construction, if bond pre-
miums are not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment the Regulations must be disregarded.
Taxable income was defined by the Supreme Court in Eisncr
v. Alacomber as the "gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital." In Bowcrs v.
Kerbaugh Empire Co.10 that Court held that a plaintiff, who
borrowed money from a bank in Germany before the War, re-
payable in marks or their equivalent in gold coin of the United
States, and who repaid the loan when marks had greatly depre-
ciated, did not realize profit or income to the extent of the depre-
ciation, under the definition of income asserted in the Eisner
case. But the same court has recently held in United States v.
Kirby Lumber Company 1" that a corporation purchasing its own
bonds at less than their issuing price realized income thereby.
The Kerbaugh case was distinguished on the ground that the
taxpayer in that case had lost the borrowed capital in the trans-
action for which he had borrowed it, whereas in the Kirby case
the transaction resulted in "clear gain." But the profit or loss
resulting from the use of borrowed capital does not seem to be
material in determining whether any part of such capital consti-
tuted income when received.' s The result of the Kirby case could
have been achieved more consistently with the definition of in-
come postulated in Eisner v. Macomnber by adopting the Com-
missioner's "effective rate" theory, under which the repurchase
of bonds at less than their issuing price indicates that the inter-
est which the corporation had deducted as an expense each year
during which the bonds were outstanding exceeded the legiti-
mately deductible "effective rate" by an aliquot part of the dis-
count at which the bonds were repurchased. The practical diffi-
culty of disturbing old tax returns in order to include this excess
legislative sanction and approval." Indeed, the same tribunal, without
mentioning this doctrine, had previously held in Independent Brewing
Company v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 870 (1926), that a corporation pur-
chasing its own bonds for less than the amount at which they v.ere issued
realized no income thereby, despite the fact that Article 544 of Treasury
Regulation 45 asserted a precisely contrary policy and was unaltered by
the Revenue Act of 1921. This decision was followed in New Orleans,
Texas, and Mlexico Ry. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 436 (1927), and in
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. - (Oct. 15, 1931).
In the latter case the Board differentiated between the bonds themselves
and interest coupons attached thereto, holding that the excess of the face
value of the coupons over the amount paid for them was taxable as income.
15 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. CL 189, 193 (1920).
16 271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct. 449 (1926).
17 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (U. S. 1931).
Is See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 44 F. (2d) 885, 887 (CL CI.
1931).
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amount may have led the court to reason as it did,1" but in the
absence of this consideration, there would seem to be no reason
why the Commissioner's theory should not be accepted. It seems
apparent that bond premiums furnish a mere "increase in the
capital reservoir," a "feeding by the springs of investment," and
in this respect are similar to stock premiums, 0 which in the
Fall River case the Board of Tax Appeals conceded could not be
regarded as income.21 Moreover, the classification of bond pre-
miums as income seems inaccurate from an economic point of
view, when it is considered that a corporation, barring bank-
ruptcy, must inevitably pay back more than it receives from the
sale of its bonds. Such a sale is purely a financing transaction in
which the corporation contemplates profit from the use of the
capital which is borrowed and not from the mere loan itself.
The Supreme Court seems to have noted this distinction in Eis-
ner v. Macomber, and, in pointing out the distinguishing attribute
of income, said, "Here we have the essential matter: not a gain
accruing to capital, not a growth or increment of value in the in-
vestment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value
proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however
invested or employed." 22
If it be conceded that bond premiums are not "income" within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, it would seem that
the Commissioner's excess interest theory should be adopted,
for otherwise a corporation, by selling bonds with a high nominal
interest rate, could reduce its net income by the amount of the
premium received, and thus escape taxation pro tanto. This con-
sideration may have induced the Board of Tax Appeals in the
Fall River case to classify bond premiums as income when it
felt itself constrained to reject the Commissioner's "excess in-.
terest" theory. While appreciating the possible significance of
"effective interest" or "excess interest" in accounting practice,
with respect to bond premiums, the Board was not willing to
assume "that Congress ... in granting to a taxpayer the right,
in computing net taxable income, of deducting. . . 'all interest
paid or accrued ... on its indebtedness,' 23 had in mind such a
theory and used this term in the restricted sense denoted in ac-
counting parlance as 'effective interest' to the exclusion of a
portion of the interest paid." 24 The Board further suggested
29 See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 960.
20 For an excellent argument to this effect see the dissenting opinion of
Murdock, J., in the Fall River case, supra note 4, at 175.
21 Supra note 4, at 173.
2 Supra note 15, at 207, 40 Sup. Ct. at 193.
23 Revenue Act of 1926 § 234 (a) (2).
24 Fall River Electric Light Co. v. Commissioner, suprav note 4, at 171.
Cf. the opinion of the same tribunal in Chicago, R. I., and Pacific Ry.
v. Commissioner, supra note 5, allowing the deduction of an aliquot part of
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that "interest on indebtedness has a definite and well accepted
meaning as the 'compensation allowed by law or fixed by the
parties for use, or forbearance, or detention of money'," and,
"we think it clear that the word 'interest' as used in the cited
provision of the taxing act is to be understood in its ordinary
sense." 25 By basing its conclusion solely on a question of the
legislative intent to include the Commissioner's theory the Board
precluded any inquiry into its validity. Yet accounting author-
ities agree that the sale of bonds at a premium merely indicates
that the interest rate is higher than it need be were the bonds
marketable at par.26 This view seems to have been recognized
by the Board of Tax Appeals itself in Chicago, R. L, & Pacific
Ry. v. Comrnissianer,' where it conceded that it is immaterial
whether bonds sold at par carry the market rate of interest, or
whether if sold at a premium they carry a higher rate, or a lesser
one if sold at a discount, since, other things being equal, the rate
of interest finally paid will be the market and not the contract
rate. Where a corporation provides that its bonds shall carry
a high nominal interest rate, in order to sell them at a premium,
the transaction seems in effect an offer to sell the bonds to the
purchaser who is willing to take the greatest reduction of in-
terest, the amount of the reduction to be paid by him in ad-
vance in the form of a premium.S Even though Congress may
not have directly contemplated the Commissioner's "excess in-
terest" theory, it seems reasonable to assume that in using the
term "interest" Congress did have in mind interest as paid in
the typical loan transaction, where no discount or premium is
involved. Such interest represents the "effective rate" for which
the Commissioner contends. Moreover, whether or not the term
"interest" as understood in its "ordinary sense" excludes the
Commissioner's theory is at least debatable. The courts seem
to agree that a corporation may deduct as an expense for the
taxable year an aliquot part of any discount at which its bonds
were sold in addition to the interest paid its bondholders .- And
bond discounts. In order to reconcile the two opinions it is necessary to
assume that Congress contemplated the Commissioner's theory of "effective
interest" with respect to bond discounts but not with respect to bond
premiums. Such an assumption appears absurd.
2 Fall River Electric Light Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 4, at 171.
2 HATFELD, ACCOUNTING (1929) 90, 227, 228; 2 KESTER, ACCOUNTING
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1925) 370, 393; SALiERs, AccouNTS IN TEonX AND
PRACTICE (1920) 169, 171; DICKINSON, ACoUNTING PRACTICE AND Ps0cmua
(1917) 66, 134, 135.
27Supra note 5, at 1031.
213 See the dissenting opinion of Seawell, J., in the Fall River case,
supra note 4, at 176.
2" Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 9; Chicago,
R. I. & Pacific Ry. v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
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if it be admitted that bond discounts in an original sale are
"deferred interest" the argument by analogy that bond premiums
are "excess interest" seems to be logically irrefutable.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF THE LESSOR UNDER
AN OIL AND GAS LEASE TO PROTECTION AGAINST
DRAINAGE
FROM a relatively early date the courts recognized that in the
absence of express stipulations the lessee of an ordinary oil and
gas lease, after oil had been found in paying quantities, was under
an implied obligation reasonably to develop the premises.' Such
a duty was held to comprise the duty of drilling additional wells 3
and the duty of protecting the leased property from drainage
through wells on adjacent land,3 which not infrequently were
owned by the lessee himself. In an effort to avoid the incubus of
these duties, mining corporations soon devised the "or" lease, in
which the lessee covenants to drill a stipulated number of wells or
pay "delay rentals,"' 4 and the "unless" lease, which imposes no
"duty" of development but automatically terminates unless the
lessee drills a specified number of wells within a designated pe-
riod or pays rentals for the privilege of deferring operations.,
But even under these leases, the lessee, although in a measure
relieved of his obligation to drill additional wells,0 must still pro-
tect the leased premises from drainage.
I Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 118, 123, 48 N. E. 502, 505 (1897) ; see
Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. 436, 442, 18 Atl. 339 (1889) ; of. New State Oil
& Gas Co. v. Dunn, 75 Okla. 141, 142, 182 Pac. 514 (1919) ; W. T. Waggoner
Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 517-519, 19 S. W. (2d.) 27, 29 (1929).
2 Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502, 35 Atl. 109 (1896); of. Ryan v. Kent,
36 S. W. (2d) 1007, 1011 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931). But of. Venture 011
Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 All. 732 (1893).
3 Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S. W. 286 (1921);
Notes (1922) 19 A. L. R. 437 (1929) 60 A. L. R. 950; cf. Jones v. Inter-
state Oil Corporation, 1 Pac. (2d) 1051 (Cal. App. 1931). A Kentucky
statute now makes compulsory the drilling of off-sets. XY. STAT. (Carroll,
1930) § 3766b-4c; cf. Tsx. CoMP. STAT. (1928) §§ 5369, 5370 (asylum and
school lands). The Legislature may also limit the right to offset. Oxford
Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 22 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
As to the constitutionality of statutes limiting production, see authorities
cited infra note 35.
4 See SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1927) § 215.
5 See form lease "Midcontinent 88."
o Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel, 71 Okla. 142, 175 Pac. 920 (1918).
But of. Ohio Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Irvin Development Co., 184 Ky. 517,
212 S. W. 110 (1919) (lessee cannot by paying "nominal" rentals postpone
development indefinitely).
Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.'W. (2d) 872 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
In West Virginia, the lessee under an "or" lease is not liable for damages
during the period in which he has paid delay rentals, but if he has failed
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The basis for the implication of these duties of development
and protection was found in the nature of oil leases and in public
policy considerations. The sole remuneration received by the
lessor in the earlier leases was in the nature of royalties received
from the actual production and marketing of the oil pumped, s
and, argued the courts, if the lessee were left to his own devices,
he would hold the lease for speculation, thereby depriving the
lessor of his rent9 Furthermore, because of the peculiar mobile
nature formerly attributed to oil and gas,1 it was supposed that
the lessor, himself unable to go on the land and drill during the
term,"' might be completely deprived of his minerals by delin-
quency on the part of the lessor in drilling. Finally, in the early
days of oil production, the courts believed it in the public inter-
est to have oil lands developed as rapidly and exhaustively as pos-
sible.'- These considerations, which led to a policy rule of con-
struction against the lessee and in favor of the lessor,23 are re-
sponsible for the implementing of the duties to develop and pro-
to drill protection wells during that time he may have his lease forfeited at
the end of the rental period, the obligation to protect being construed as a
condition subsequent rather than a covenant. Carper v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916). But cf. Chapman v. Kendall, 145
Okla. 107, 291 Pac. 97 (1929) ("substantial" rentals), and cases of waiver,
note 19 infra.
On similar grounds it would seem that the lessee under an "unless" lease,
although under no duty either to drill or to pay, must nevertheless protect
the leased premises from drainage. See Note (1930) 67 A. L. R. 221-236.
8 See Acme Oil & Mining Co. v. Williams, 140 Cal. 681, 684, 74 Pac. 296,
297 (1903); cf. Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 807-808, 22 S. W.
(2d) 1015, 1017 (1930).
9 See Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 35, 29 S. E. 978, 981 (1898);
Huggins v. Daley, 99 Fed. 606, 613 (C. C. A. 4th 1899); cf. Monarch Oil,
Gas & Coal Co. v. Richardson, 124 Ky. 602, 607, 99 S. W. 668, 669 (1907);
Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587, 592-593 (1875).
1 oSee State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 30, 49 N. E. 809, 812 (compared
to ferae naturae); of. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Giller, 38 S. W.
(2d) 766 (Ark. 1931). But cf. Sigler Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner's Estate,
276 S. W. 936, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (wild-cat territory) aff'd in
118 Tex.-509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27 (1929). For a discussion of the "ancient"
conceptions of the mobility of oil and gas, see Veasy, Law of Oil alzd Gas
(1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 445, 452.
" Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229, 248 (1366) ; cf. O'Neil v. Sun Co., 58
Tex. Civ. App. 167, 123 S. W. 172 (1909) (lessor required to account for
lessee's share of oil produced from offset drilled by lessor). The lessee is
usually given "an exclusive right" under the lease.
2 See Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.
E. 655, 660 (1902); Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142, 148 (1875); cf.
Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. (2d) 824, 831 (C. C. A. Sth 1928).
13See Emery v. League, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 474, 480, 72 S. W. 603, 607
(1903); Kies v. Williams, 190 Ky. 596, 600, 228 S. W. 40, 42 (1921); cf.
Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 447-448, 26 S. E. 271, 276 (inequality
of bargaining power between lessor and lessee a consideration) ; Bortz v.
Norris, 248 Mich. 247, 251-2, 226 N. W. 860, 861 (1929).
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tect into the lease as implied covenants or conditions subsequent,"
a breach of which may effect a termination of the lease,"' be evi-
dence of an intent to abandon,-0 or serve as the basis for a suit
by the lessor to recover damages,27 or have the lease forfeited."
It was never supposed, however, that the lessor acquired an
14 The obligation to protect is usually considered a covenant rather than
a condition. SUMMERS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 453 and authorities there
cited, n. 20. With the recognition of the lessor's power to claim a forfeiture
for breach of this obligation, it became a condition as well. Ibid. 467-460.
In Texas, where the lessee's interest is construed as a determinable fee in
the minerals, the obligation has been alternately held a special limitation
and a condition subsequent. See Walker, The Nature of Property Interests
Created By An Oil And Gas Lease in Texas (1930) 8 TEx. L. REV. 483, 601.
Development is not a duty but a condition in an "unless" lease, See Note
(1930) 67 A. L. R. 223, 224. For a discussion of the nature of the legal in-
terests ordinarily created by a lease, see SUMMERS, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 8.
"5 Stephenson v. Calliham, 289 S. W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); 11aUl v.
Augur, 82 Cal. App. 594, 256 Pac. 232 (1927); of. Tedrow v. Shaffer, 23
Ohio App. 343, 155 N. E. 510 (1926); United States v. Brown, 15 F. (2d)
565, 567 (N. D. Okla. 1926). As to termination under the modern lease,
see Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931)
41 YALE L. J. 33, 45, n. 42. The lessor must exercise his option of forfeiture
under an "or" lease. Allen v. Narver, 178 Cal. 202, 172 Pac. 980 (1918).
No such affirmative action is necessary under an "unless" lease, time being
furthermore "of the essence." Abell v. Bishop, 86 Mont. 478, 284 Pac. 525
(1930).
16 Mitchell, Jones & May v. Dabney, 294 S. W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
cf. Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1926) (no
"relinquishment" necessary in oil and gas lease, lessee having no title). See
criticism of the doctrine of abandonment in Texas, Walker, op. cit, supra
note 14, 7 Tax. L. REV. 589-596, 8 ibid. 505-511. Compare Leonard v. Prater,
36 S. W. (2d) 216, 221 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931), with the same case in
18 S. W. (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
17 Kellar v, Craig, 126 Fed. 630 (C. C. A. 4th 1903); see Note (1922) 19
A. L. R. 450; cf. Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 431. The court may also decree
that further development be made. Webb v. Croft, 120 Kan. 654, 244 Pac.
1033 (1926). Such a decree, however, will not be granted under an "unless"
lease. See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (1926)
246; Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, supra note 16, at 279, 280, 253 Pac, at
35, 36.
18 An exception to the "rule" that "equity abhors a forfeiture" is made
in the case of oil and gas leases. Robinson v. Miracle, 146 Okla. 31, 32,
293 Pac. 211, 212 (1930). The Kentucky court no longer recognizes this
exception. Conley v. Wheeler-Watkins Oil & Gas Co., 216 Ky. 494, 600, 288
S. W. 350, 352 (1926) ; Johnson v. Dodson, 227 Ky. 132, 137, 12 S. W. (2d)
310, 312 (1928). But cf. Monarch Oil, Gas, & Coal Co. v. Richardson,
supra, note 9. The Kentucky Legislature, however, has recently passed a
statute requiring forfeiture for failure to protect. KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930)
§ 3766b-4c. Cf. MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 6902 (provision for
release from record after forfeiture). The attitude of the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals is anomalous and inconsistent. Cf. Stephenson v. Calliham,
supra note 15 (forfeiture decreed) ; Hanover Co. v. Hines, 11 S. IV. (2d)
621 (1928) (failure to develop "requires exercise of court's equity powers")
Leonard v. Prater, supra note 16, at 221.
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unqualified right to protection under-these implied covenants. By
injudiciously accepting a delay rental he might waive it.'1 In
some states he is required to give a prescribed form of notice al-
lowing the lessee a reasonable time to act thereon. A stipulation
in the lease as to the number of additional wells that are to be
drilled may also be held a limitation of the lessee's duty to drill
offsets. -1 Finally, his right may be defeated if the defendant can
prove that in not drilling an offset he had acted as an ordinarily
prudent operator, having regard to the interests of both parties. =
Under this general defense, the lessee may show that the adjacent
wells which the lessor wished offset were not producers, 3 that
there was no imminent or substantial danger of drainage,24 or
possibly that an offset would not prove profitable,2 the lessor
bearing the burden of proof on all these issues,2 and "due defer-
ence" being given to the lessee's judgment.27 A few jurisdictions
have even held the lessee's bone ide judgment binding on the
'19 Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, 255 S. W. 7 (1923) ;
Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 10th 1930); cf. Texas Co. v.
Ramsower, supra note 7, at 876 (lessor must "intend" acceptance of the
rental as a waiver).
20Johnson v. Dodson, supra note 18; Wapa Oil & Development Co. v.
McBride, 84 Okla. 184, 201 Pac. 984 (1921). But cf. Solberg v. Sunburst
Oil & Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926); Calhoma Oil Corpora-
tion v. Conniff, 207 Cal. 648, 279 Pac. 771 (1929); Hariis v. Kerns, 144
Okla. 225, 291 Pac. 100 (1930) (bringing of suit sufficient notice of intent
to forfeit under "or" lease). In the principal case of Leeper Oil Co. v.
Rowland, infra note 37, the court held the notice insufficient.
21 0'Neil v. Sun Co., supra note 11; cf. Stoddard v. Emery, mtpra note 1;
But cf. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 810-811 (C. C. A. 8th,
1905); Culbertson v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 87 Ken. 529, 125 Pac. 81
(1912) ; MERRiLL, op. cit. supra note 17, § 64. The lessor's right to protec-
tion may also be limited by agreement. Linn v. Wehrle, 35 Ohio App. 107,
172 N. E. 288 (1928). Cf. Davis v. Mose, 112 Okla. 38, 239 Pae. 447 (1925)
(payment in lieu of drilling). But cf. Jones v. Interstate Oil Corporation,
supra note 3. Or by statute. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co.,
supra note 3; R. R. Commission of Texas v. Bass, 10 S. W. (2d) 586 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
22 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra note 21, at 814; Hays v. Bowser,
158 S. E. 169 (W. Va. 1931); Cf. Ohio Oil Co. v. Reichert, 343 Ill. 560, 5G7,
175 N. E. 790, 793 (Ill. 1931).
23 Franklin v. Wigton, 132 Okla. 236, 270 Pac. 1 (1928) ; cf. Pelham Pe-
troleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Poe, 29 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
24 Doiron v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 172 La. 553, 134 So. 742 (1931). Com-
pare Goodwin v. Standard Oil Co., 290 Fed. 92, 98 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) with
Ohio Fuel Supply Co. v. Shilling, 101 Ohio 106, 109, 123 N. E. 873, 874
(1920).
25 State Line Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas, 35 S. W. (2d) 740 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) ; of. Ward v. Daugherty, 228 Ky. 326, 14 S. W. (2d) 1089 (1929).
2c Texas Pacific Coal & Iron Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 0 S. W. (2d)
1031 (1928) (amount and value of oil or gas product must be alleged and
proved), and cases cited supra notes 23-25.
2Cf. Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Diles, 200 Ky. 188, 254 S. W. 205 (1923);
Weisant v. Follett, 17 Ohio App. 371 (1922).
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Those jurisdictions that have defined the lessee's duty in terms
of "the ordinarily prudent operator" have weighed the amounts
already expended by the lessee in exploring, drilling, transport-
ing, and marketing in relation to his net profits against the roy-
alties already received by the lessor,29 placing increasing empha-
sis on the fact that the lessor has everything to gain and nothing
to lose from the drilling of new wells, whereas the lessee must
undergo large expense and great risks with perhaps insufficient
returns therefore. 0 Likewise considered have been the quality
and character of the oil and gas stratum,"' the proximity of a
profitable market and the costs of transportation thereto.32 There
has also appeared a tacit recognition that the reasons for the
28 This is the Pennsylvania doctrine. Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa.
234, 45 Atl. 119 (1899); But see Highfield Co. v. Kirk, 248 Pa. 19, 22-23,
93 Atl. 815, 817 (1915). West Virginia seems to confuse the two standards.
Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368 (1918) (fail-
ure to exercise ordinary prudence constitutes "fraud") ; Blue Creek Develop-
ment Co. v. Howell, 101 W. Va. 748, 133 S. E. 699 (1926) (unjust en-
richment). The Kentucky court has recently adopted the majority rule.
Swiss Oil Corporation v. Risner, 223 Ky. 397, 3 S. W. (2d) 777 (1928).
The "good faith" standard has been criticized in Brewstor v. Lanyon
Zinc Co., supra note 21, at 812-815, and in Texas Co. v. Ramsower, supra
note 7, at 874-875. But cf. Little v. Stephenson, 1 S. W. (2d) 353 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927). That its too strict application may lead to evident in-
justice, see the case of Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa.
362, 65 Atl. 801 (1907) (lessor refused protection against drainage though
robber wells operated by lessee because lessee's action not "a fraud per so").
2 Hart v. Standard Oil Co., 146 La. 885, 84 So. 169 (1920) (lessee's ex-
penditures, $650,000 with little profit; lessor's royalties, $90,000); Austin
v. Ohio Fuel Oil Co., 218 Ky. 310, 291 S. W. 386 (1927) (total expenditures
over $37,000; total realized $41,000 without deduction for depreciation, taxes,
and overhead). Cf. Johnson v. Dodson, suprs note 18 (19,000 expended and
record "fails to show even approximately" income received therefrom).
See also Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyffe, 219 Ky. 640, 294 S. W. 176 (1927).
30 See Swiss -Oil Corporation v. Risner, suprd note 28, at 401, 3 S. W.
(2d) at 778 (the lessor "does nothing but cogitate over his contemplated
royalties and collects and enjoys them after they come"); cf. Goodwin v.
Standard Oil Co., supra note 24, at 95.
31 Indiana Oil and Gas Development Co. v. McCrory, 42 Okla. 136, 145, 140
Pac. 610, 614 (1914); cf. McKnight v. Manufacturer's Natural Gas Co.,
146 Pa. 185, 23 Atl. 164 (1892) ; Allen v. Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689,
115 S. E. 842 (1923). Compare Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S. W.
(2d) 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), with Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291
S. W. 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also Becker v. Submarine 0il
Co., 55 Cal. App. 688, 204 Pac. 245 (1921) (extent of oil reservoir).
32 Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920). Compare Pennagrade
Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin, 211 Ky. 137, 277 S. W. 302 (1926), with Pryor
Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 Pac. 570 (1924). See also
Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 24 S. W. (2d) 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930).
The rule requiring development seems somewhat relaxed in "wildcat" ter-
ritory. Houston v. Highland Oil Co., 6 La. App. 325 (1926).
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earlier policy of protection to the lessor are failing23 The lessor
now is often given a substantial consideration, either as an in-
ducement for the lease or by way of valuable rentals, and is thus
no longer exclusively dependent upon his royalties for remunera-
tionY' And some courts seem at last aware that the public is*
today interested in conservation rather than intensive develop-
ment of oil fields.35 Finally, the presence of a demoralized oil
market making it to the advantage of the lessor as well as the
lessee to sacrifice present development has received implicit rec-
ognition in a few recent decisions.--,
The recent case of Leeper Oil Co. z'. Rowland :7 seems indica-
tive of the new trend in the construction of oil and gas leases. In
this case, under a lease executed in 1919, four producing wells had
33 See O'Donnell v. Snowden & McSweeney Co., 237 Ill. App. 156, 165
(1925), af'd in 138 Ill. 374, 149 N. E. 253 (1926) ; Bouldin v. Gulf Produc-
tion Co., 5 S. W. (2d) 1019, 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
34 Cf. Smith v. Louisiana Refining Corporation, 12 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. .4
8th 1926) ($12,500 initial consideration); Leonard v. Prater, supra note 16
(contingent bonus of $5,000). For a valuable and exhaustive discussion of
what consideration will support a lease; see Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiede-
man Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S. W. 323 (1924). Cf. SumMERS, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 381. But of. Jones v. Interstate Oil Corporation, supra note 3, at
1053.
33 Cf. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., supra note 3; Julian
Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Atl. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930); People
v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 96-97, 294 Pac. 717, 72:3 (1930); People
v. Associated Oil Co., 297 Pac. 536 (Cal. 1931). See Nevada Consolidated
Copper Co. v% Consolidated Coppermines Corporation, 44 F. (2d) 192, 198
(I). C. Nev. 1930). For legislative conservation of oil resources, see Legis-
lation (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1170, 1172 if.; Note (1930) 43 HLRv. L. RPv.
1137; Note (1930) 67 A. L. R. 1347.
36 Cf. Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Thomas, 29 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 5th
1928) (lack of market a defense for failure to develop); Austin v. Ohio Fuel
Co., surpae note 29, at 312-313, 291 S. W. at 387; Beech Fork Coal Co. v.
Pocahontas Corporation, 109 W. Va. 39, 152 S. E. 785 (1930); Steven v.
Potlatch Oil and Refining Co., 80 Mont. 239, 260 Pac. 119 (1929) ; Smith v.
Sun Oil Co., 135 So. 15 (La. 1931) (since no available market, no produc-
tion in "paying quantities"). See also cases supra note 32. But cf. Carroll Gas
& Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 278, 21 S. W. (2d) 445 (1929) (failure to market
gas ground for suit). A few dicta in other periods of oil "overproduction"
have apparently been ignored. See for example Paraffine Oil Co. v. Cruce,
63 Okla. 95, 100-103, 162 Pac. 716, 721-723; Note (1917) 14 A. L. R. 907;
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra note 21, at 813-814. But see Masterzon
v. Amanillo Oil Co., 253 S. W. 908, 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ("financial
depression throughout the country no excuse" for non-development). A
distinction has been made between the failure to market oil and the failure
to market gas, the latter obligation not being so strictly enforced, since the
lessor's royalties are usually not dependent, as in the case of oil, on the
actual sale of the product but rather on the number of gas wells drilled. Cf.
Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813 (1910);
see Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyife, supra note 29, at 043-644, 294 S. W. at
177-178.
37 39 S. W. (2d) 486 (Ky. 1931).
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been drilled and exploited to their full capacity and were yield-
ing at the date of suit one and a third barrels per day. Since 1923,
however, no additional wells had been drilled despite conceded
drainage by wells of equivalent capacity operated on adjacent
* territory and also owned by the lessee. The plaintiff, after re-
peatedly requesting the lessee to offset these wells, brought suit to
compel development of his tract of land, or in the alternative, for
cancellation of the lease. There was no provision in the lease for
delay rentals or for forfeiture. The lessees relied "as their chief
defense" on their contention that "the lease had been already
drilled and developed as much as conditions of the market and
cost of operation justified, and that under the existing and pre-
-vailing conditions in the oil business it would be imprudent and
with sacrifice and loss to the parties concerned to develop fur-
ther at the present time." Ignoring this defense, the trial court
decreed that the lessee should forthwith drill another well and
should it prove a producer the lessee should sink three wells a
year, or, in its discretion, cancel the lease. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals, although acknowledging the defendant's implied duty
diligently and in good faith to develop the premises, took cogni-
zance of the defense and held that the lessee, as a reasonably pru-
dent operator, was under no duty to make further development
at the time. To achieve this result the court took judicial notice
of "the nation-wide depression" particularly in its effect upon the
oil industry, emphasizing the overproduction and consequent
"ruinously low" prices of oil, and in effect suggesting that un-
favorable market conditions may in themselves defeat the les-
sor's right to protection. 38
Commendable as this result may at first seem as a step towards
the readjustment of oil and gas law to modern conditions, it may
give rise to certain very tangible evils. If the lessee's duty to
offset is to be defined in terms of a highly-fluctuating market,
leases will be rendered nugatory, the lack of certainty as to rights
and duties under them will be increased, and courts will find
themselves functioning in the capacity of supervisory industrial
commissions. That the price of oil has an important bearing on
the profitability of development and protection and consequently
on the standards to be expected of a reasonably prudent operator
cannot be denied. But to hold that the current price of oil, which
cannot be gauged as high or low without reference to the entire
price structure, is determinative of the extent of the lessee's duty
seems a dangerous precedent.
38 Oil was selling at about $1.50 a barrel when suit was brought and had
declined considerably since "the time of trial of this action." The Kentucky
statute, supra note 3, was enacted after the execution of the lease and was
held to have no retroactive effect. See also note 20, supra.
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More easily might the Kentucky court have rested its decision
upon the failure of the lessor to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the lessee could have drilled a profitable offset.3
Since the lessee was also operating the robber wells, however, it
would seem that, regardless of the question of profit, the lessor
should in good conscience receive royalties for as much of the
oil produced on adjacent territory as he could show was being
drained from his premises.40 The obstacles in the way of such a
showing are but some of the difficulties presented by this case,
which might well serve to illustrate the thesis that relief of the
oil industry must be sought not in sporadic judicial measures
but in governmental supervision and control of unit operation4
THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL
AF=ER the most thorough examination of a bail system which
has been undertaken in any jurisdiction an investigator has con-
cluded that its breakdown is in large measure attributable to
the failure of courts to avail themselves of the potential flexi-
bility of the bail law.' This conclusion was advanced in face
of-the fact that in the jurisdiction in which the survey was con-
ducted, as in most others, comprehensive constitutional and stat-
utory provisions attempt to regulate the bail system in detail.
Thirty-five states by constitution 2 and one by statute 3 guaran-
tee that, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties ex-
cept for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption great." Four except only murder and treason from
39 As in the cases cited in note 25, supra.
40 Cf. Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 437, 443. This was the course adopted in
Culbertson v. Iola Portland Cement Co., supra note 21. Compare the de-
plorable result reached in Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.,
supra note 28.
4' Cf. Marshall and Meyers, op. cit supra note 15, at 48, 63-64 et pasdim.
In Union Oil & Gas Co. v. Fyffe, supra note 29, the court actually attempted
a "judicial" form of unit operation of a block of gas fields.
1 BEELEY, BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927) 160.
2AI", art. I, § 16; ARiz., art. II, § 22; ARK., art. II, § 8; CAL., arL I,
§ 6; CoLo., art. II, § 19; CONN., art. I, § 14; DEL., art. I, § 12; FLA., Declara-
tion of Rights, § 9; IDAHO, art., I, § 6; ILL., art. II, § 7; Iow,% art. I, § 12;
KAN., Bill of Rights, § 9; Ky., Bill of Rights, § 16; LA., art. 12; ME., art.
I, § 10; MINN., art. I, § 7; Miss. art. III, § 29; Mo., art. II, § 24; MONT.,
art. III, § 19; N. D.r art. 1, § 6; NEv., art. I, § 7; N. J., art. I, § 10;
N. M., art. II, § 13; OHIO, art. I, § 9; OKLA., art. II. § 8; PA., art. I, §
14; S. C., art. I, § 20; S. D., art. VI, § 8; TENN., art. I, § 15; Tux., art. I,
§ 2; UTAH, art. I, § 8; VT., § 32; WASH., art. I, § 20; WIS., art. I, § 8;
WYo., art I, § 14. Unless otherwise stated the article and section refer
to the state constitution.
3 New Hampshire, PUBLIC STATUTES, 1926, c. 366, § 13.
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the constitutional guarantee.4 In many situations this absolute
guarantee of bail in most offenses has brought about undesirable
results which would probably have been avoided in those states 1
which enforce the common law rule allowing magistrates prac-
tically unlimited discretionary power to grant or refuse bail.0
If bail is a matter of right, the magistrate may not refuse it,
even though the petitioner has previously absconded and it is
probable that he will again abscond,7 and even though he is ac-
cused of an offense committed while on bail previously granted.,
The remedy for these conditions lies in the difficult field of con-
stitutional revision.9
However, even in those jurisdictions which guarantee bail in
the terms quoted above, the effect of judicial action is fundamen-
tal. Thus, in interpreting and applying the clause excepting from
the guaranty capital cases where the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption great, courts have arrived at strikingly different results.
In Oklahoma and two other states the burden is placed on the ap-
plicant to show that the proof is not evident nor the presumption
great; 10 in Texas and three other states the burden is on the
prosecution.1' Moreover, in determining what weight shall be
given an indictment for a capital offense, jurisdictions have ar-
rived at widely different results. In three states the indictment
is conclusive that proof of guilt is evident; 12 in seven it creates
4 IND. CONST., art. I, § 17; MICH. CoNST., art. II, § 14; NED. CONST.,
art. I, § 9; ORE. CoNST., art. I, § 14.
6 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia. In three states statutes provide that bail is a matter of right
where the offense charged is a misdemeanor. GA. PEN. CODS (1926) §
958; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby 1924) art. 52, § 12; N. Y. CODE CRIM. POC.
(Gilbert 1920) § 553.
GRex v. Baltimore, 4 Burr. 2180 (1768); Rex v. Rudd, I Cowp. 331
(1775). This is apparently still the law in England. 9 HALsBUuY, LAWvS
OF ENGLAND (1909) 323.
7Rowan v. Randolph, 268 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920); KCendrick
v. State, 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S. W. (2d) 859 (1930). But if ball is dig-
cretionary, it will be refused. In re Lamar, 294 Fed. 688 (D. N. J. 1924).
8 See SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY (1924) 213, where reference is made
to a case in which a criminal released on bail was re-arrested four times
for fresh crimes and each time admitted to bail.
9 See I CODE OF CRnINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 10.
oEx parte Decker, 37 Old. Cr. Rep. 105, 257 Pac. 332 (1927) ; Ec parto
Andrews, 39 Old. Cr. Rep. 359, 265 Pac. 144 (1928); Ex parto Paige, 82
Cal. App. 576, 255 Pac. 887 (1927); Ex parte Tully, 70 Fla. 1 (1914).
"'Ex parte Perkins, 40 S. W. (2d) 123 (Tex. 1931) ; Ex pacrto Donohoo,
112 Tex. Cr. App. 124, 14 S. W. (2d) 848 (1929); In re Haigler, 15 Ariz.
150, 137 Pac. 423 (1913); State v. District Court, 35 Mont. 504 (1907);
State v. Kaufman, 20 S. D. 620 (1906).
12 State v. Butler, 40 La. Ann. 3, 3 So. 350 (1888) ; State v. Kuchlor, 129




a rebuttable presumption of that fact; 1" and in four, it is given
no weight.:" In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
argued that, in view of the rule that the presumption of inno-
cence remains until conviction and that bail is generally granted,
the burden of proving evidence of guilt sufficient to warrant a
denial of bail should rest upon the state after as well as before
indictment." Where the death penalty
, has been abolished, it
has been held that the exception of capital cases from the con-
stitutional guarantee is ineffective and that in all cases bail is
mandatory before conviction.16 However, in jurisdictions in
which the death penalty may be inflicted, a case is "capital"
within the meaning of statutes denying bail in capital cases after
conviction pending appellate review even though a sentence of
life imprisonment has been imposed.17  This distinction seems
to result naturally from the general definition of capital cases
as those in which the death penalty may be imposed.18
It is well established that the general constitutional guarantee
of bail is applicable only before conviction,"" and although the
constitutions of eighteen states provide a further guarantee of
bail after conviction pending appeal in a variety of cases less
than capital,20 ordinarily the power to admit a convicted prisoner
to bail is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Frequently
statutes provide that bail should not be granted in capital cases
after conviction;21 but if the conviction has been reversed for
"Deaver v. State, 135 So. 604 (Ala. 1931); In re Losasso, 15 Colo.
163 (1890); Rigdon v. State, 41 Fla. 308, 26 So. 711 (1899); State v.
Hedges, 177 Ind. 589 (1911); Exc parte Towndrow, 20 N. i. 631, 151 Pac.
761 (1915); Ex parte Fraley, 3 O]d. Cr. 719, 109 Pac. 295 (1910); State
v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 Pac. 681 (1895).4 Jordan v. State, 25 Ariz. 249, 215 Pac. 926 (1923); Ford v. Dilley,
174 Iowa 243, 156 N. W. 513 (1916); Ex parto Verden, 291 Mo. 552, 237
S. W. 734 (1921); Ex parte Howard, 99 Tex. Cr. App. 456, 270 S. W. 550
(1925).
15 Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S. W. (2d) 563 (1931).
'16M, parU Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 Pac. 424 (1920); see In re Welisch,
18 Ariz. 517, 520, 163 Pac. 264, 265 (1917).
"7People -. St. Lucia, 315 Ill. 258, 146 N. D. 183 (1925); State v.
Barone, 96 N. J. L. 374, 114 Atl. 809 (1921); Ex partc Herndon, 18 O1l.
Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920). Contra: Walker v. State, 138 Ark. 517, 209
S. W. 86 (1919).
2s See cases cited supra note 17; 1 BouviEn, LAW DICTioNARY (3d ed.
1914) 419.
3. See Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 807, and In re Halsey (Ohio), U. S. Daily,
Nov. 17, 1931, at 2114. Co'nb'a: State v. Williarson, 135 La. 662, 65 So.
877 (1914).
20 See CODE CRImINAL PRocEDuRE (Am. L. Inst. 1928) 266. In ten states
bail is a matter of right when the appeal is from a judgment imposing
a fine only. Ibid. 264.
21 AnKN DIo. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2958; CoLO. Co tp. LAWS
(1921) §7113; DEL. REV. PODE (1915) § 3980; FLA. REV. STAT. (1920)
§ 6151; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2386; IowA CODE (1924) § 13610;
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insufficient evidence, bail is generally allowed pending retrial
on the ground that the reversal indicates that the death penalty
will not be inflicted. 22
If bail is once granted, no review is open to the prosecution.23
The effectiveness of a magistrate's discretionary ruling, however,
is limited by the practice whereby a prisoner whose application
for bail has been denied presents successive applications to other
magistrates.24 The evil of peddling bail petitions has been en-
couraged by the lack of information concerning previous denials
of application and by the failure of magistrates to attach suffi-
cient weight to a previous denial. New York has attempted to
remedy this condition by enacting a statute requiring an appli-
cant for bail to list, on oath, any previous applications, 25 but it
is evident that this provision will be ineffective unless magis-
trates will regard a previous order denying bail as presump-
tively correct, in accord with the rule adopted on appellate re-
view of a bail order.2 6
'The bail system derives most of its flexibility from the vir-
tually unlimited discretion of magistrates in fixing the amount
of bail. It is true that the constitutions of practically all juris-
dictions provide that, "Excessive bail shall not be required." 21
But the courts have interpreted this provision in favor of a
liberal exercise of discretionary power, and have held bail to
be excessive only if the amount required is unnecessary to secure
the compliance of the accused with the conditions of the bail bond,
and not merely because he cannot obtain it.28 Furthermore, while
KY. CODES (Carroll, 1927) Cr. Prac., § 75; S. C. CODE OF LAws (1922) §
121. In Louisiana the granting of bail after conviction for a capital
offense is forbidden by the constitution. Art. I, § 12. See generally Note
(1926) 45 A. L. R. 458.
22Ex parte Westcott, .57 Cal. App. 4, 270 Pac. 247 (1928); Ex parto
Davis, 28 S. W. (2d) 165 (Tex. 1930). But if competent evidence indicates
that the death penalty will be inflicted upon new trial, bail is denied.
Ea parte Berwick, 33 S. W. (2d) 444 (Tex. 1930); Cofer v. Henderson,
131 So. 421 (Miss. 1930).
23 See the practice in In re Pantages, 209 Cal. 535, 291 Pace 831 (1930)
and in United States v. Morton, 10 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
Legislation in four states restricts the number of original applications
which may be made. ALA. CODE (1923) § 3368; N. Y. CR. CODE (Gilbert,
1930) § 563; ORE LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 1642; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon,
1917) § 7114.
24 EX parte Marshall, 300 Pac. 1011 (Ariz. 1931).
' N. Y. CR. CODE (Gilbert, 1930) § 556-a. See also CODE CRIMINAL PaO-
-CEDURE (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 76.
26 E0 parte Turner, 112 Cal. 627, 45 Pac. 571 (1896) ; Ex parto Ruble, 18
Okl: Cr. 134, 193 Pac. 1009 (1920) ; State v. Rosander, 46 S. D. 516, 194 N,
W. 837 (1923).
27 N. Y. CONST., art. I, § 5; MASS. CONST., art. II, § 20; CALIF. CONST.,
art. I, § 6. Illinois has no such provision.
28EX parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 5f2 (1927); Ex parto Spoon,
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the magistrate allowing bail may at any time require additional
security or may revise its amountY- an appellate court will re-
duce the amount fixed only in extreme cases, the rule being that
for purposes of an application to reduce the amount of the bail
the accused is presumed guilty of the offense charged.zo Effec-
tive exercise of this large discretion presupposes a careful con-
sideration of the character, previous record and financial cir-
cumstances of the accused, the nature of the offense charged,
and the severity of its penalty, as indicia of the inducement to
abscond.3' The sort of routine administration of bail, however,
which actually obtains in so many instances,3 renders the suc-
cess of the system largely fortuitous.
Originally a person released on bail was deemed delivered into
the personal custody of his sureties, who were generally rela-
tives or friends. 33 This personal relation presumably deterred the
accused from forfeiting his bail and inflicting a loss upon his
sureties, and further permitted surveillance by the sureties who
might at any time surrender the accused into court and secure
their own exoneration34 In contemporary England bail is still
generally required to be furnished by friends or relatives of the
accused. 35 But in the United States the widespread operations
of surety companies and professional bondsmen have divested
the relationship between the accused and his sureties of any
personal element,36 and unquestionably decreased the effective-
ness of the obligation. And whatever effectiveness might be
left is destroyed by acceptance of worthless sureties and by a
notorious failure to enforce forfeitures.37 In some states legis-
18 Old. Cr. 703, 192 Pac. 698 (1920); Ex, parte Glass, 81 W. Va. 111, 93
S. E. 1036 (1917). Cf. People v. Snow, 34 Ill. 464, 173 N. E. 3 (1930)
($50,000 bail required of one held on vagrancy charge, but clearly habitual
criminal, held unreasonable and reduced to -5,000).
-People v. Eiseman, 69 Cal. App. 143, 230 Pac. 669 (1924); In re
Mariano, 34 R. I. 534, 84 Atl. 1086 (1912); Ex parte Reis, 33 S. W. (2d)
435 (Tex. 1930).
30Ex parte Grimes, 98 Cal. App. 10, 277 Pac. 1052 (1929); Ex parto
Horiuchi, 105 Cal. App. 714, 288 Pac. 708 (1930); Ex parte Ruble, supra.
note 26.
-1 People v. Searles, 229 App. Div. 603, 243 N. Y. Supp. 15 (3d Dep't
1930); Ex parte Bice, 107 Tex. Cr. 87, 296 S. W. 541 (1927).
3. BEEmn, op. cit. supra note 1, at 31, 33, 159. In Ex parte Reis, supra
note 29, the practice of endorsing the amount of bail on indictments pre-
sumably without any examination of the accused is revealed.
33 4 BL. COIM. *297.
34 HALE, CROWN PLEAS *124; 1 CHrTY, CRIMINAL LAW *124.
35 HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (1931) 339, 340.
36 BEELY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39.
37Waite, The Problem of Bail (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 71. The results
of several crime surveys showing the lax enforcement of bail bond for-
feitures are collected and commented upon in WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OP
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1929) 562 et seq.
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lation has been enacted prescribing the qualifications of sureties
and expediting the enforcement of forfeiture.38
Where a person charged with a petty offense is well established
in the community and is certain to make no attempt to abscond,
it may be desirable that he be relieved of the expense and in-
convenience of providing bond. Two methods of securing this
end have been suggested: the substitution of a summons for a
warrant so that the accused is never committed to confinement
pending trial, and the substitution of a personal recognizance
for a bond with sureties.39 While the latter procedure has the
advantage of adding a pecuniary sanction to enforce compliance,
it may be of doubtful validity "in those jurisdictions in which
constitutional or statutory provisions prescribe that persons shall
be bailable'by sufficient sureties,40 unless, as is possible, the re-
quirement of sureties be held directory only.
The same necessity of securing a person's attendance upon
judicial proceedings without subjecting him to confinement has
induced almost all jurisdictions to enact statutes permitting or
requiring the committing magistrate to cause material witnesses
for the prosecution to enter into a recognizance for their ap-
pearance to testify.41 The desirability of such a requirement
38 Statutes are collected in 1 COD OF CIMINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst.
1928) 282 et seq. See especially, N. Y. CR. CODE (Gilbert, 1930) §§ 569,
593, 595.
39 Cobb, Bondsmen Fatten on Needless Bail, 9 PANEL 39 (1931) ; B EELIy,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 154, 155; CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (1922)
203. In England, the magistrate may dispense with sureties. ARCin0LD,
CRMINAL PRACTICE (28th ed. 1931) 90.
40 Supra, notes 2 and 4.
4'Discretionary: CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 878; GA. ANN.
CODE (Michie, 1926) PENAL CODE § 940; IDAHO Com'. STAT. (1919) § 8702;
Miss. ANN. CODE (1930) § 3007; MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1021) §
11791; N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 1828, § 25; N. D. Como. LAWS ANN.
(1913) § 10617; OKLA. ComP. STAT. ANN. (1921) § 2503, 3003; ORE.
CODE (1930) c. 13, § 2230; PA. STATUTES (Purdon, 19,31) c. 19, § 651;
R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6315; S. D. Coop. LAWS (1929) § 4588; TiX.
ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) CODE CRiM. PROC. art. 300; UTAH ColoP. LAWS
(1917) § 8761; VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) § 2557; WYo. Comr. STAT. (1920)
§ 7359.
Mandatory: ALA. CODE (1928) § 5242; ARK. DIa. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses 1921) § 2935; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 3349; DEL. REsV.
COD (1915) § 3972; FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 8341; ILL. REV.
STAT. (Smith-Howard, 1929) c. 38, § 683; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§ 2110; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 62, § 623; IY. CODES (Carroll,
1927) Crim. Prac. Code § 69; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 145, § 16; MASS.
GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 276, § 45; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10589; Mo.
REv. STAT. (1929) § 3483 (if a felony is charged); N. I1. Pun. LAWS
(1926) c. 366, § 33; N. M. ANN. STAT. (1929) c. 79, § 215; N. C. CODu
(1927) § 4568; OHIO CRIr. COD (Patterson, 1929) § 1433 (15); S. C.
CODE CRIM. PRAC. (1922) c. 2, § 16; TENN. ANN. CODs (Shannon, 1919)
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was early recognized in English law,- and Hale speaks of it
as more ordinary and more effectual than the subpoena to secure
the attendance of witnesses. 3 However, the efficacy of the sys-
tem is impaired in some states by limiting the amount at which
the recognizance can be fixed to a figure so low as to make it
ineffective where there is a strong inducement not to testify,44
and by lack of statutory authority to require sureties, in which
case the magistrate must accept a personal recognizance in all
cases. -5 An absolute requirement of sureties may also work an
injustice upon a witness who is committed to jail merely be-
cause of honest inability to procure sureties2 In such a case
some statutes provide for the taldng of a deposition and the
release of the witness upon his own recognizance.--
It is evident that the efficiency of a bail system is ultimately
dependent upon its administrators. Yet the value of well-con-
sidered legislative reforms cannot be minimized. 2  For large
cities, where the problem is particularly acute, Detroit's ex-
perience with a centralized municipal criminal court indicates
that centralization of administration would improv6 the bail
system as well as increase efficiency in other aspects of criminal
administration.9 Centralization would permit a closer scrutiny
§ 7026; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1931) c. 62, art. 3, § 13; WASH. COMP. STAT.
(Remington, 1922) § 1959. In Crosby v. Potts, S Ga. App. 463, 69 S. E.
582 (1910) it was held that the power exists independently of statute.
Conta: Little v. Territory, 28 Okla. 1467, 114 Pac. 699 (1911).
42 1 & 2 Ph. & Mary, c. 13 (1554) permitted magistrates to require a
recognizance of material witnesses.
43 2 HALE, CROWN PLEAS *282.
4 4 ALA. CODs (1928) § 5242 ($100); IDAHO ComP. STAT. (1919) § 8762
($500); TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1919) § 7026 ($250); UTAiu ComP.
LAWS (1917) § 8761 ($200).
45Ex parte Shaw, 61 Cal. 58 (1882). Comfort v, Kittle, 81 Iowa 179,
46 N. W. 988 (1890). Cf. Little v. Territory, su'pra note 14.
46 Medalie, Symposium. on Material Wit-Messes, 8 PANEL 1 (1930) (sailor
jailed as material witness for nine months because of failure to furnish
bond). See United States v. Lloyd, 4 Blatchf. 427, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 614
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1860).
- MAss GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 276, §§ 49, 51; MOxT. REV. CODES (Choate,
1921) § 11794; UTAH ComP. LAWS (1921) § 8765; WASH. Co' P. STAT.
(Remington, 1922) § 1962. If a witness is unable to provide sureties,
he shall be released on his own recognizance. TEX. ANN. STAT. (Vernon,
1925) CODE Cans. PRoC., art. 300; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10589 (ex-
cept in cases of murder, arson involving the loss of life, and criminal
abuse of children). In Illinois, a statue expressly provides that no witness
shall be compelled to give other security than his own recognizance. ILL.
REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 38 § 683.
-sSee generally, CODE OF CRIAUNAL PROCED E (Am. L. Inst. 1928)
§§ 35-56.
4 9Harley, Detroit's New Model Criminal Court (1920) 11 J. Crim. L.
389- 04. °
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of bondsmen by confining their operations to a single court; it
would tend to restrict the practice of peddling applications for
bail; and it would facilitate observation and criticism of bail
administration.
